Its the occupation, stupid
Yesterday's sickening massacre of teenage boys at a religious school in Jerusalem is now being claimed by Hamas.*
This is particularly depressing, coming after Hamas' suicide attack on Dimona last month, because it represents a defeat for moderates within the group who were agitating for a shift of accent away from military operations and toward political solutions. These moves have been rejected at every turn by Israel and the West - for example, by starving the people of Gaza as punishment for voting for Hamas in an election, or by plotting a coup against the elected Palestinian government. It now appears that the small opportunity to take a step closer to peace that was offered by possible Hamas moderation is beginning to fade.
Of course, Hamas is far more of a threat to Israeli state power (not the Israeli population) as a political group that refuses to relinquish its people's rights than it is as a group of terrorist killers of innocent people. Hamas' reversion to these attacks, after a several months long unilateral ceasefire which held up reasonably well, is the predictable consequence of Israel and its allies slamming the door shut on Hamas moderation. Blood flows as a consequence.
Over the next few days, weeks and months, we can expect yesterday's massacre to be ruthlessly exploited for every ounce of propaganda value by the Israeli government and its apologists. A huge effort will be made to cast this attack as what Israeli spokesman Mark Regev called "a defining moment", placing it at the centre of the conflict and indeed portraying it, and acts of terrorism like it, as the reason for the conflict.
Terrorism is not the reason for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The reason is the occupation, of which terrorism is an ugly and entirely predictable symptom.
Let me quote at length from January's report by UN Special Rapporteur John Dugard (the whole report is absolutely required reading for anyone with a serious interest in this issue). Remember, the following is not drawn from a radical Islamist source or from some obscure left-wing publication. It is the considered opinion of a 71 year old South African professor of international law, who has served as a judge on the International Court of Justice and who has written extensively on South African apartheid.
In his capacity as United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Dugard reported as follows:
"Terrorism is a scourge, a serious violation of human rights and international humanitarian law. No attempt is made in the reports [presented to the UN by Dugard] to minimize the pain and suffering it causes to victims, their families and the broader community. Palestinians are guilty of terrorizing innocent Israeli civilians by means of suicide bombs and Qassam rockets. Likewise the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) are guilty of terrorizing innocent Palestinian civilians by military incursions, targeted killings and sonic booms that fail to distinguish between military targets and civilians. All these acts must be condemned and have been condemned. Common sense, however, dictates that a distinction must be drawn between acts of mindless terror, such as acts committed by Al Qaeda, and acts committed in the course of a war of national liberation against colonialism, apartheid or military occupation. While such acts cannot be justified, they must be understood as being a painful but inevitable consequence of colonialism, apartheid or occupation. History is replete with examples of military occupation that have been resisted by violence - acts of terror. The German occupation was resisted by many European countries in the Second World War; the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) resisted South Africa's occupation of Namibia; and Jewish groups resisted British occupation of Palestine - inter alia, by the blowing up of the King David Hotel in 1946 with heavy loss of life, by a group masterminded by Menachim Begin, who later became Prime Minister of Israel. Acts of terror against military occupation must be seen in their historical context. This is why every effort should be made to bring the occupation to a speedy end. Until this is done peace cannot be expected, and violence will continue. In other situations, for example Namibia, peace has been achieved by the ending of occupation, without setting the end of resistence as a precondition. Israel cannot expect perfect peace and the end of violence as a precondition for the ending of the occupation."
"A further comment on terrorism is called for. In the present international climate it is easy for a State to justify its repressive measures as a response to terrorism - and to expect a sympathetic hearing. Israel exploits the present international fear of terrorism to the full. But this will not solve the Palestinian problem. Israel must address the occupation and the violation of human rights and international humanitarian law it engenders, and not invoke the justification of terrorism as a distraction, as a pretext for failure to confront the root causes of Palestinian violence - the occupation."
What follows inescapably from this is that anyone with a genuine desire to ensure that atrocities like that committed yesterday never happen again will be redoubling their efforts to campaign for the end of the illegal occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip - "the root cause of Palestinian violence". Some, like the Israeli government, will use yesterday's atrocity as "a pretext for failure" to end that occupation. They will hasten their continuing colonisation of stolen land, and blame the consequences of their crimes for their failure to end those crimes - a wonderfully absurd and self-serving piece of propagandist non-logic. We can only conclude from this that the Israeli government has little more respect for Israeli life than it does for Palestinian life. It accepts Israeli deaths from Palestinian terrorism, the "inevitable consequence" of its policies, as a price worth paying in exchange for the prime real estate it is stealing from the Palestinians, in flagrant breach of international law.
Israel-Palestine is not complicated. Its "root cause" is the theft, occupation and systematic crushing of an innocent civilian population by the Israeli state (a catastrophe described in heart-rending detail here by a group of leading aid agencies) in epic and serial breaches of international law and common morality. The solution is well known - the immediate and total end of the occupation, and a Palestinian state with fully equal rights to the Israeli state being established on the whole of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza strip - i.e. Israel's immediate adherence with international law.
And there is a single and straightforward test of a person's seriousness when they talk about an end to this conflict. Are they focusing their efforts on effecting the solution just described? Or are they finding reasons to shift the focus elsewhere? Judge the verbal and policy responses to yesterdays events, from politicians and commentators, on that basis.
*[update - there's some confusion in the press this afternoon about whether this claim of responsibility was genuine, as it was originally reported].
Labels: Israel/Palestine
posted by David Wearing at 3:47 PM
19 Comments:
"The solution is well known - the immediate and total end of the occupation, and a Palestinian state with fully equal rights to the Israeli state being established on the whole of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza strip"
But that 'solution' abandons the 20 per cent of the population of Israel which is not Jewish, and which suffers comprehensive discrimination in a state which is sectarian to the core. It is like saying that the solution to apartheid Soth Africa was a black state alongside a white state. The only humane solution is a single, secular state, with equality under the law. Israel is an anomaly in the modern world because of its sectarianism and its resistance to social equality. Israel's human rights abuses are well known but its sectarianism is muffled and rarely acknowledged in mainstream discourse.
It's also plain that the only Palestinian state which the superpowers are interested in is an authoritarian rump state ruled by a quisling (Abbas or some other toady), so that Palestine can join the other client states (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia etc).
I'm a bit surprised to see you going for the two state solution, to be honest.
Ellis, good to hear from you. Thanks for your response.
Since this is 'The Democrat's Diary' you can of course take it as read that I'm in favour of both of the two states being full democracies.
On the two-states vs one-state question, I'm with Noam Chomsky and Norman Finkeltein; the people whose analysis of this issue I value the most. You're probably familiar with what they've said on this, but google it if not. They make the case very well.
In sum, you have the following supporting a two-state settlement:
1/ International law, as confirmed by the landmark opinion of the highest judicial body on the planet - the International Court of Justice in its 2004 ruling on the Israeli separation wall. That was a major victory for the pro-Palestinian side, squandered both by the Palestinian leadership and by the Palestinian people's international supporters.
2/ The UN General Assembly, which votes every year to reaffirm support for a two-state settlement by a margin of 180something countries to 3 (the three being the US, Israel and Lilliput, or somesuch)
3/ A large proportion, sometimes a majority, according to Chomsky, of US and Israeli public opinion. I believe this extends to Palestinians as well. And I would confidently expect that world public opinion agrees. Depends on how the question's phrased of course.
And note that even Israel and the US have to lie and say they support a two state settlement too, and miss-sell their one-state-plus-bantustans plan on that basis. Such is the level of support across the board for two-states.
Support for one state, by contrast, is functionally non-existant.
That huge support for two-states didn't just materialise overnight. It was worked for over decades. Now its proposed that all that work should be ripped up, all that masses of support and strength should be rejected, and we should go to square one and campaign for something that barely anyone supports and that, more importantly, is never going to happen (unless Israel decides to commit suicide).
It seems impractical.
What's important, first of all, is that the killing stops, the starvation stops, the repression stops and that some modicum of justice prevails. The clearest route to those goals, which are non-trivial as I'm sure you'll agree, is the two state settlement. The huge support there is now for two genuine states means that that goal may only require a concerted effort of political pressure from those who support it.
By contrast, I think the US and Israel would be absolutely delighted - overjoyed - if supporters of Palestinian rights abandoned the call for two states - now of all times - and set off on some Quixotic odyssey in search something that won't happen. In the meantime, they could get on with stealing plenty more Palestinian land, and killing plenty more Palestinians.
I understand and sympathise with those calling for one democratic state for jews and arabs. In a theoretical sense there's much to commend it on ethical grounds. But unfortunately, we have to conduct our political activity in the real world. And as it is, I really despair when I see this idea catching on. There can be no better way to damage the Palestinian cause than to voluntarily dispose of all the greatest weapons in its political armoury. And I suspect the damage would be permanent.
Thanks for the considered response, David.
I think supporters of Israel would argue that it is already a democracy. The objection to the Jewish state is not its absence of democracy but its sectarianism and discrimination against those who do not belong to the primary social group. Of course Israel is only prepared to accept democracy as long as Jews are an overwhelming majority of the electorate, hence ‘the demographic problem’ of the high Arab birth rate.
While Chomsky and Finkelstein support the two state solution, there are equally formidable anti-Zionists who support the one state solution. They include Edward Said, Ilan Pappé, Jonathan Cook, Ghada Karmi and Tariq Ali. Three of them were involved in The One State Declaration: http://onestate.net/pages/declaration.htm
The one state solution is one founded “in terms of equality and integration, rather than separation and exclusion”.
You cite international law and the ICJ ruling on the separation wall, and blame the pro-Palestinian side for squandering that victory. In the first place the ruling was non-binding and therefore of no real consequence, other than as a propaganda victory. Secondly, I’m afraid I think that you fetishize law. My own view of international law is shaped by China Miéville’s analysis in his book BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS (2005), which I recommend if you don’t already know it.
You refer to the UN General Assembly. I regard this institution as the embodiment of imperialism. It cannot be seriously regarded as a body which will ever liberate the Palestinians from their occupation. Indeed, it was the UN which handed over Palestine to the Zionist minority and legitimized the occupation.
As for “public opinion”. What benefit have Palestinians ever derived from that? You say that “Support for one state, by contrast, is functionally non-existent.” I recently read on the Electronic Intifada that the one-state scenario is now increasingly favoured by the younger Palestinian generation, who realise that interminable negotiations for two states are leading nowhere.
You say that “I think the US and Israel would be absolutely delighted - overjoyed - if supporters of Palestinian rights abandoned the call for two states - now of all times - and set off on some Quixotic odyssey in search something that won't happen.” That is not borne out by this:
Israeli Prime Minister Olmert recently argued, in an interview with the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, that without a two-state agreement Israel would face "a South African-style struggle for equal voting rights" in which case "Israel [would be] finished."
You argue that “We have to conduct our political activity in the real world.” In the real world I think all that Israel and the US want is a West Bank ruled by an authoritarian corrupt Fatah elite which suppresses dissent, and a Gaza which is either repressed into non-resistance by extreme violence or where Hamas are overthrown by force and replaced by an authoritarian and unelected Fatah elite.
The liberation of the Palestinians will not be achieved by international law or the UN. It can only come from the solidarity of other Arab populations (who will need to overthrow their dictatorial regimes first) and from the solidarity of people in Britain and the USA, who challenge the complicity of their governments in the dispossession of the Palestinians.
Let me finish with a quote from Todd May:
There is not a single moment in the history of Israel, and in particular of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, in which Israel was prepared to recognize a viable, independent Palestinian state existing along its borders. (The Barak proposal at Camp David is often offered as a counterexample. However, I fail to see how a demilitarized state that does not have control of its borders, its airspace, its aquifers, or many of its central roads is considered a viable state. If there is a non-starter, that was certainly it.) There is no reason to believe that Israel is to be enticed into a two-state solution, so the question then becomes one of the terms in which it is to be confronted.
http://www.counterpunch.org/may09092004.html
70 per cent of Palestinians support the one state solution:
http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article6589.shtml
Those poll results do not seem to fit the trend - I've seen many that show majority support for a two-state settlement.
Perhaps the reason is that many Palestinians support a one-state settlement, but would be happy to settle for a two-state (as far as I could see, the poll you linked to didn't ask about a two-state settlement).
ellis, if you're basing your hope for an end to the occupation on its being overthrown by force, whether by Palestinians or Arabs in the Middle East (or both), then you're effectively saying that Palestinians will continue to suffer under what is in effect a military dictatorship for the foreeable future, and probably well beyond that.
I don't think we have to be so pessimistic. As you say, the occupation can be ended with "the solidarity of people in Britain and the USA, who challenge the complicity of their governments in the dispossession of the Palestinians."
It's like the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, supported by Australia, the U.S. and Britain. It was largely public pressure on these Western governments, in response to coverage of Indonesian massacres, that caused a change in government policy towards East Timor and, ultimately, led to Indonesia's withdrawal.
I think the same is possible here. If public opinion can be effectively mobilised to pressure a change in U.S./EU policy towards Israel, then I think it's certainly possible that Israel could be forced to accept a genuine two-state settlement. Israel could never be pressured, on the other hand, into dissolving itself as a Jewish state.
So the question is: can we more effectively mobilise public opinion in the West on the basis of a single-state settlement or two states? Clearly, for the reasons David outlines, its the latter. A two-state settlement enjoys broad support, while the one-state enjoys virtually none.
"In the real world I think all that Israel and the US want is a West Bank ruled by an authoritarian corrupt Fatah elite which suppresses dissent, and a Gaza which is either repressed into non-resistance by extreme violence or where Hamas are overthrown by force and replaced by an authoritarian and unelected Fatah elite."
This is undoubtedly true, but it's not irreversible. As your quote from Todd May says, the question is: how to confront the Israeli occupation. How can we most effectively do this? This is the issue, and in evaluating different tactics we must look at their what their likely impact will be in the real world. By this criteria, I think Norman Finkelstein is right to say that the best strategy is the path of least resistance. That means calling for a two-state settlement, which is supported by the UN, the ICJ and the overwhelming body of public opinion in the states that matter (primarily the U.S., EU). Successfully advocating the two-state settlement is still very difficult, because Israel and the U.S. are committed to opposing it, but it surely has a far greater chance of achieving something positive than calling for a single state, which enjoys virtually no support anywhere.
A few comments, if I may. On the polling data, I would point out that it is consistent with more recent polling. As late as 2003, most Palestinians indicated support for a two-state settlement, but registered the belief that Israeli measures such as the separation wall and so on would make this increasingly implausible.
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p9epressrelease.html
By February 2007, nearly three quarters of Palestinians supported a one-state solution:
http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=33100
Now, there are domestic political reasons for this, as Virginia Tilley has pointed out. Fatah and the Palestinian Authority had for a long time suppressed discussion of a one-state settlement, seeing it as subversive of their diplomatic efforts. Actually, there was a recent poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media Communications Centre which found 51% support for a two-state settlement, but also found 68.5% support for the right of refugees to return to their homelands. (Palestinian Pundit gave some interesting grounds for wondering about that poll, though: http://palestinianpundit.blogspot.com/2007/08/fabricating-palestinian-public-opinion.html) And, as Ali Abuminah has pointed out, the polls frequently leave out the millions of Palestinian refugees who might also have a point of view on the matter. I suspect, though this is only a suspicion, that a combination of Hamas' ascension to power and Israel's onslaught is responsible for producing the latest results. At any rate, it is unfair to say that support for a one-state solution is 'functionally non-existent'. It exists strongly in one of the most relevant population centres, the Palestinians themselves.
I note the concern about tactics, and I don't wish to foreclose options. However. Could we be clear, just for a start, that a two-state settlement would not be justice? In fact, given Israel's role in US policy, can we agree that even if Palestinians and their supporters could muster the political strength to force a two-state settlement on the best of terms, with a contiguous land mass and the abolition of all settlements, with Jerusalem as the capital, that would still leave a cheated and vulnerable population living in an impoverished state next to a bunkered, racist, aggressive and expansionist power? I don't ask these questions to set an elaborate test, I'm just probing for areas of agreement and disagreement. The point I am making is that while one can imagine a two-state settlement as a half-way house and as a considerable improvement on the present, everything about Israel that makes it objectionable at the moment would conspire to militate against the long-term viability of a two-state settlement.
If the argument is that a two-state settlement will end the killing and repression, then I would say it's the other way around. Israel has never shown any sign that it is interested in a two-state settlement or any kind of settlement other than Palestinian submission. The current level of violence is clearly an attempt to ensure that a settlement never happens, because the Israeli state regards the existence of Palestine as an inherent threat. Further, it was confident enough to recently try to make good Ben Gurion's claim to southern Lebanon by creating 'facts on the ground'. It seems that it would require a serious defeat of Israel to force it to accept a two-state settlement in the first place. And no amount of Hamas rocket-fire could achieve that - it would take a shattering re-ordering of the political situation in the Middle East, with the overthrow of all or most of the US-backed tyrants, especially Mubarak.
As for mobilising public opinion, isn't the sensible approach to focus on opposition to Israeli policies and support for Palestinian rights without specifying either a one-state or two-state solution? I mean, when we organise demonstrations and rallies and petitions, we don't usually focus on the demand for a particular kind of settlement, since that would limit the number of people involved and shut down discussion. At any rate, our role is to strengthen the Palestinians so that they can come to terms that they accept. However, that doesn't mean to say that pro-Palestinian activists shouldn't take the argument further once we're in discussion: we should be clear that the injustice goes back to 1948, not 1967, and that the basis for a long-term settlement and for justice is the abolition of an inherently unjust and racist system, namely Zionism. What's more, the two-state advocates have nothing to fear from one-state advocates. We, the latter, can open up the debate and make the two-staters look like the moderates they are.
Finally, the 'path of least resistance' is not necessarily the best one. Just because it happens to be easier to take that position given the prevailing climate doesn't mean that it is tactically wise to base one's position on legalism and consensus. If it seems like an appealing route, that is only because we overlook the traps along the way. After all, the consensus can change, as can legal opinion. The fact that the consensus endures does not mean it is durable. If Israel succeeds in its strategy of ethnically cleansing northern Gaza and annexing more and more of the West Bank, then eventually the consensus will come to accept the 'facts on the ground', and, in the same way that people argue that you can't just give the Americas back to the Indians, it will simply become a part of the enduring geography of the Middle East. Legal opinion, being the product of power, would probably shift accordingly, or at least de-emphasise certain things. After all, the component of UN Resolution 242 that emphasises a just settlement of the refugee problem is sure to be interpretated in ways that simply allow Israel to consider the current settlement just. (The fact that the language on that question is so opaque is itself the product of extensive US chivvying). We have to be prepared to make a more difficult and potentially more unpopular argument at times, otherwise we make ourselves the playthings of PR operations and manouevres by powerful states.
It's like the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, supported by Australia, the U.S. and Britain. It was largely public pressure on these Western governments, in response to coverage of Indonesian massacres, that caused a change in government policy towards East Timor and, ultimately, led to Indonesia's withdrawal.
Jamie, where is the evidence for that? It strikes me on the surface as palpably untrue. Whatever pressure the US was under in 1999, it was probably less than in 1975. The truth is that the East Timorese movement had been negotiating a settlement accepting the terms of Australian polito-military dominance and a neoliberal settlement for some years before hand. In other words, they had abandoned the revolutionary and independent policies that made Washington support Indonesia's prolonged genocidal campaign in the first place. A deal was being negotiated when Clinton allowed the TNI and its allies to carry out their massacres - presumably a final reminder not to mess around - and then ordered them to withdraw. Jose Ramos-Horta has recently been assassinated, probably because of his pro-Western position, which has seen Australian troops arrive to defend the government against protest.
You may as well argue that the Clinton administration finally put a stop to the CIA-FRAPH murder in Haiti because of 'popular pressure'. I would like to believe it, but it just isn't true. What the Clinton administration did was continue to apply heavily the sanctions of terror and death squads, using it to force Aristide to accept what he didn't accept in 1991: the policies of his opponent. Having secured that, as well as immunity for the CIA-FRAPH operatives, the administration had no problem calling off the dogs for the time being.
hi lenin,
re. the East Timor analogy - my recollection of reading about it was that public opinion played a significant role in the final reversal of policy, but I may well be wrong about that. So forget about that analogy for now.
The IMRA poll you linked to shows high support for a one-state settlement, but it doesn't ask whether the Palestinians would accept a two-state settlement. While they may ideally prefer a single state, they may be willing to accept a two-state settlement as a way to end the suffering.
I obviously dislike the idea that Palestinians would have to agree to relinquish some of their basic rights just for some relief from the relentless bombing and starvation. And in fact, I agree with you that a two-state settlement is inherently unjust - it leaves the refugees out, it is a recipe for a Palestinian state that is totally dominated by its powerful neighbours and it does nothing for the Palestinian citizens of Israel, who will remain second-class citizens in a Jewish state.
So I'm clear that, as you say, a two-state settlement would be an injustice. However, I simply can't see Israel being persuaded or forced to dissolve itself as a Jewish state in the foreseeable future. It's not going to happen. So while a single, democratic state remains the ideal, the ultimate goal, in the meantime we are left with the problem of how to minimise human suffering there, and how to achieve at least some justice for the Palestinians. The two-state settlement seems to me to be our best chance of achieving this.
I think our goal should be to try and force our governments to pressure Israel into offering the Palestinians a genuine two-state settlement. Of course that's still an extremely difficult task, but I think it is possible, and certainly more achievable than trying to force Israel into accepting a single state. We can do this by, as you say, trying to organise people around the injustice, the suffering and so on. I do think that it's good to present people with something to work for, however. We can get everyone outraged with description of what is going on and has gone on, but the point remains to channel that outrage into political demands - in Britain, this would presumably mean forcing a change in British policy towards Israel (this is more significant in the U.S., obviously, because that country has far more influence over Israel than we do). I think this would be far more achievable by organising for a two-state settlement, which already enjoys broad support, than around a single state, which enjoys virtually none.
Incidentally, even if you don't agree with the legalist approach, you shouldn't underestimate the importance international law, the ICJ decision and so on have as a card in the debate. Having recourse to legal principles like the illegality of acquiring territory by war, or the illegality of Israel's settlements, really does help in trying to win people over.
I agree with you, though, that it's beneficial to have some people arguing for a single state, since they move the terms of the debate leftwards, which strengthens the two-state position. Also, if Israel eventually is pressured into offering the Palestinians a genuine two-state settlement and the Palestinians reject it on the grounds that it is unjust, it would be our obligation to support them in that. This will be easier to do if the single-state argument was already being made.
I agree that it's not always best to adopt the path of least resistance. In this case I think it is, because the general consensus happens to be a two-state settlement, which would go a significant way to easing Palestinian suffering and achieving some amount of justice, and because the alternative is simply unachievable in the forseeable future.
Thanks to the three of you. Its good to have some intelligent, progressive debate happening here. Often its either me "debating" with some ultra-Zionist troll, or silence. :-)
I'll try to respond to most of what's been said over the course of today, as time etc allows.
Starting with Ellis
"I think supporters of Israel would argue that it is already a democracy. The objection to the Jewish state is not its absence of democracy but its sectarianism and discrimination against those who do not belong to the primary social group."
ok, then lets clarify terms. This is why I talk about "full democracy", as opposed to the sort of compromised democracy Israel has (and many other countries have for various reasons). Since democracy isn't just about voting and being able to stand for election, and since Palestinians are denied all sorts of civil rights in Israel, essentially on racial grounds, I couldn't describe Israel as a "full democracy".
"While Chomsky and Finkelstein support the two state solution, there are equally formidable anti-Zionists who support the one state solution"
Sure, but its Chomsky's and Finkelstein's analysis that I view as being superior on this, for the reasons I've been setting out here.
"You cite international law and the ICJ ruling on the separation wall, and blame the pro-Palestinian side for squandering that victory. In the first place the ruling was non-binding and therefore of no real consequence, other than as a propaganda victory."
and you also say
"As for “public opinion”. What benefit have Palestinians ever derived from that? "
On international law as it affects this debate, the boy Stern-Weiner has it exactly right.
There's no other route to political victories for the left than persuading people of the rightness of our point of view, and thus creating political realities in terms of popular opinion which governments are then forced to work with. That's it, I'm afraid.
Any solution - as things stand - will need a certain degree/mixture of popular support, acceptance and acquiescence in the US, Israel and the OPT (and in the rest of the world as a secondary concern) for it to be sustainable.
I've never seen an argument that adequately explains (or even addresses, come to think of it) how a one-state solution is going to achieve that level of support/acceptance amongst all three publics, particularly Israel. Or how a one-state solution could be brought about in the absense of that support - i.e. imposed on Israel.
Could Israelis accept withdrawing to the Green Line in exchange for peace and recognition? Quite possibly? Would that then create an atmousphere more conducive to a successfull civil rights campaign for Palestinians in Israel? Again, quite possibly.
Alternatively, will Israel voluntarily commit suicide as a state? Somewhat less likely. In what circumstances would that happen?
I agree with Chomksy that failure to address those questions means one hasn't even reached a level where one can talk about oneself as engaging in advocacy. Working out what's right or what you're in favour of is piss-easy. Working out how you're going to get there is the serious business.
The fact that there's a level of support/acceptance for the two-state settlement in all three key areas (I'll talk about the OPT later) gives it the maximum chance of success. That makes the task one of mobilising opinion, as opposed to both persuasion then mobilisation, where persuasion is close to impossible in one crucial area to begin with.
Only one of those is a reasonably feasible plan.
When approaching the task at hand, international law is, above all, an extremely potent tactical weapon in the battle of ideas. It lends enormous legitimacy to your argument. After all, in many respects it simply formalises what we all know. E.g. in this case, that theft (aquisition of territory by force) is wrong.
Finkelstein made an very important point when he spoke in London last month. The Zionists took their paper victories (Balfour, the partition plan) and turned them into powerful political weapons. Our paper victories have far more worth, far more power in the only relevant battlefield - public opinion - and yet, most notably in the case of the ICJ ruling, they're left unused.
When he talked about how the Palestinians could just go to the Separation Wall with nothing more than picks and shovels, waving copies of the ICJ ruling, and tear it down themselves, it really brought into sharp focus how unsustainable US/Israeli rejectionism is, and how powerful these "paper victories" could potentially be.
This is not a question of "fetishising" the law, or getting into "legalisms". Its about a simple recognition of (a) the real-world possibilities and (b) tools available to complete the task.
tbc
More in response to Ellis
On Palestinian public opinion, I'd be interested to see a poll that showed (a) level of support for a single democratic state, (b) level of support for two democratic states on the 67 borders, and (c) which of these two was seen as more achievable in any settlement with Israel.
Just asking if you're in favour of one democratic state or not, in principle, isn't enough. I'd probably answer yes to that, but its an academic question.
On what Olmert said about one-state, we're talking about two separate things here. He's comparing maximum Zionist goals with the Sharon/Kadima "convergence" plan (one-state-plus-bantustans). He prefers the latter to the former. The choice he considers is not between two states and one state. The question of two-states on the 67 borders doesn't arise since, as we know, the US and Israeli governments have never been in favour of two states - actual states - on the 67 borders.
I'm going to have to shoot off in a minute, but let me deal with a couple of Lenin's points now, and then try and come back later on.
Lenin, you ask if we can agree that a two-state solution would not be justice. Yes, of course.
I agree that the original injustice was 1948; the issue didn't begin in 67. What makes the two-state settlement particularly objectionable for me is that it still rewards Israel agression to an extent.
I don't argue that two states is perfect, or even particularly good. It is however the only realistically achievable route to minimising the injustice that's currently available.
If Gaza could trade with the outside world again, so those people could feed themselves three times a day, that would be something. Not perfection, not good, not even justice. But not trivial either. When kids grow up malnourished, when their schools can't give them lessons due to power cuts, that's an emergency. In a few short years those childhoods will be gone. Lost. Aiming now for a settlement that has no chance of realisation any time soon, if ever, seems like an unwitting betrayal of those people, to me. Better to win something now, so they can at least live. And hopefully in doing so lay the groundwork for more improvements in the future.
I'll come back later
While they may ideally prefer a single state, they may be willing to accept a two-state settlement as a way to end the suffering.
Absolutely. I have no doubt that this is the case. Were it a feasible option, available today or at any date in the future, Palestinians would surely jump at the chance, and make the most of it. I am pointing out, however, that support for a one-state settlement is by no means negligible.
I see there are strong areas of agreement between us. While I can see the allure of a two-state settlement as a medium-term goal, which seems more 'realistic' because it has more clout in official ideology, commands legal support, is formally supported by most major players etc, I am sceptical that it is even a practical solution today. However, this is a matter I want to take some time to think about and post separately on at LT.
David - on your point that a one-state solution could never command sufficient popular support in the main constituencies, I would briefly make two points: 1) popular support is probably not decisive here, especially if you're right in claiming that majorities in all three key constituencies have supported the two-state settlement for a long time; 2) popular opinion is susceptible to change. It changes as a result of pressure and time. Given that a one-state solution would be just and would remove at least one serious danger to the future of the planet, it isn't at all unreasonable to advocate such a settlement and to try - as several writers are now doing - to formulate the bases for such a settlement.
Finkelstein's point about the propaganda value of legal successes is well taken. Daniel Patrick Moynihan once observed, citing the example of Rhodesia, derecognition by the UN can be an important step in leading to the termination of a polity. (He was alarmed by the resolution equating Zionism with racism). However, the one difference between the pro-Palestinian movement today and the pro-Zionist movement in the early twentieth century is that the latter had a number of big power patrons, colonial powers at that, while the former is an inherently anti-colonial and anti-imperialist project and therefore it will not see its legal successes come to anything unless it is able to acquire much more clout than it presently has. If it was really able to do that, I daresay we wouldn't be speaking of trying to squeeze an unsatisfactory two-state solution out of the present horror. As it is, the Palestinians lack the power to impose even a fairly risible two-state settlement on Israel, and my bet is that this won't change until there is a serious transformation in the Middle East and Palestine acquires genuine allies there.
some more responses
Lenin
"We have to be prepared to make a more difficult and potentially more unpopular argument at times, otherwise we make ourselves the playthings of PR operations and manouevres by powerful states."
Plainly. This is some common ground we can all agree on.
There are two extremes that none of us here are interested in. One is total capitulation of all rights and principles to the dictates of power. The other is absolute insistance on total victory on all counts, no matter how impossible, and a preference to leave the status quo intact over accepting anything less than perfection.
There's a range of options between those two extremes, and each of us is trying to make a judgement call about which of those options is optimal in the given circumstances.
We can also agree, I dare say, on the criteria by which we judge where that point lies. Its the familiar case of maximising gains and minimising the level of compromise. And to the extent that compromise exists, you'll look to an outcome that maximises the possibilities for more progressive change further down the line.
Disagreement, therefore, comes when each of us tries to assess the political terrain and the range of possibilities. That's the judgement call.
Not to suggest that each judgement is as good as any other. And I realise the above is extremely banal. But its useful sometimes to set out where we agree.
popular support is probably not decisive here, especially if you're right in claiming that majorities in all three key constituencies have supported the two-state settlement for a long time
Fair point, but there's a difference between latent and active public support. I think its reasonable to assume that there's a lack of understanding about the true position of the Israelis, the US and the Fatah leadership. With the public support for a two state settlement you have something to work with. It should then be relatively easy to demonstrate that the powers are only pretending to propose a two-state settlement (which in itself is instructive) while actually proposing one-state-plus-bantustans.
That's where things like the world court judgement come in. As Finkelstein said, you want to be able to present an unanswerable case as often as possible. Especially given the enormous propaganda effort made by apologists for Israeli expansionism. You can hold that decision up and demand that these apologists explain why Palestinians should have anything less than the Green Line. That could be close to checkmate in the eyes of public opinion. All the apologists would have left is desperate claims that the ICJ is anti-semitic or somesuch.
Active (as opposed to latent but uninformed) public support is clearly a political reality that states have to deal with whether they like it or not. With that in favour of a two-state settlement the Palestinians are far from isolated. What was it the Washington Post said on 16/2/03 about public opinion being the world's second superpower? They may have overstated it, but there's a serious and important truth there.
Also, while a nascent Palestinian state is going to face serious threats and challenges, its fair to say that the international system is more open that it was before the US got overexcited and overplayed its hand under Bush. Without wanting to overstate the extent of multipolarity, small states clearly have more options now than they did 10 years ago.
I'm by no means blase about how limited that is, but possibilities do exist and I doubt that the Palestinians would find themselves completely alone in the world.
“Finkelstein made an very important point when he spoke in London last month. The Zionists took their paper victories (Balfour, the partition plan) and turned them into powerful political weapons. Our paper victories have far more worth, far more power in the only relevant battlefield - public opinion - and yet, most notably in the case of the ICJ ruling, they're left unused.”
But the Zionists were backed not by public opinion but by British imperialism, backed up by overwhelming military force (1936-9).
“When he talked about how the Palestinians could just go to the Separation Wall with nothing more than picks and shovels, waving copies of the ICJ ruling, and tear it down themselves.”
I’m afraid they’d just get shot, and the corporate media would not be very interested.
Obviously pragmatically the key thing is opposition to the Zionist state for both its sectarianism, its history and its continuing violent dispossession and repression of the Palestinians. One state/two state is a little abstract in the actually existing state of things. And obviously it is the Palestinian people who have to choose which of the two options they prefer (but that must include the refugees).
“Will Israel voluntarily commit suicide as a state? Somewhat less likely. In what circumstances would that happen?” On the face of it, very, very unlikely. But then who could have predicted that the Soviet Union would abolish itself? I think you might equally ask the question: Will Israel voluntarily consent to a genuinely independent Palestinian state? Answer no.
In the last analysis I’m suspicious of appeals to realism and common sense. As things stand the future looks very bleak and neither the one state nor the two state solution seems at all possible or likely. The US will continue to bluster about the road map and the Israelis will continue to procrastinate and seize more land in time-honoured fashion.
The future is always unpredictable. The collapse of the regimes in Saudi Arabia or Egypt might entirely alter the existing situation. If all the corrupt Middle Eastern regimes collapsed like a pack of cards (just as the Stalinist states did) and were replaced by democracies, the USA might no longer find it in its strategic interest to back Israel.
I prefer to be an optimist. Zionism is an irrational supremacist sectarian ideology which needs to be challenged on its own terms. Public opinion is changing but only slowly. The Green Party signed up to a boycott at its annual conference but accepted a Left Zionist amendment which rooted all the problems in 1967, not 1948. Room for improvement there…
David: this one will run and run… I am going to bow out here as I think the two points of view have been well aired and I don’t want to turn this into an interminable slanging match (particularly since I regard yours as one of the best political blogs around and what unites us is more important than where we disagree).
For anyone interested in this topic - Counter Punch recently ran a blistering attack on the ‘One State’ argument - http://www.counterpunch.org/neumann03102008.html - but promises three responses (which should start appearing any day soon).
"David: this one will run and run… I am going to bow out here as I think the two points of view have been well aired and I don’t want to turn this into an interminable slanging match (particularly since I regard yours as one of the best political blogs around and what unites us is more important than where we disagree)."
Ellis - that's very kind of you. Thanks, and thanks for your thoughtful contribtution.
one more thing (as Columbo may have said). I forgot to address the point about two-staters having nothing to fear from one-staters.
Clearly people are free to hold their own views. I can't make them adhere to mine, nor would I want to. I would simply try to persuade as many one-staters as possible to become two-staters.
With that established, I'd make two points about this. The first is on opportunity costs. Every person advocating one-state is one less person advocating two states. Given what I've said already you can see why I'd have a problem with that.
Second, if you advocate one-state, zionists will inevitably leap on this and say this is all a plan to destroy them under the guise of a call for Palestinian rights. The anti-semitism card will be played. This is catagorically not me saying that the argument should be abandoned on those grounds. Its simply to say that the argument should be made as carefully as possible, with much accent on the fact that you're talking about a state where jews and arabs all have equal rights in a democratic setting.
I don't think you two personally need that pointing out to you. But as you know, within any political movement, there are some who'd rather be pure and self-righteous than productive, who will say what they think is right in as belligerent terms and tone as they can muster, and damn the consequences.
If you really think one-state is ultimately the more practical option then ok, but if you also accept that yours is a trickier case to make then one of the challenges for you will be to ensure that anyone connected with the making of this case does so carefully and sensitively.
After all, anything that damages the Palestinian cause prolongs their suffering, and one more day when a child doesn't eat is, on its own, intolerable.
A reader had technical difficulties posting a comment, so he's emailed it to me, and I'm pasting it below. Will provide a response presently
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David et al
In the thread I have been reading with interest there has been little mention of the role of the US. Instead the focus has been on the form and mandate of the Palestinian cause. Of course none of you are unaware of the role of the US which is brazen and unambiguous (and has been for over 40 years). However it is worth taking a look at it more closely considering the rather precarious position of the States in the Middle East right now.
There has been a thaw in the rigid political discourse regarding Israel in the US. Mearsheimer's and Carter's books are both symptomatic of and have contributed to this. However it isn't quite clear why or how significant this is.
You have mentioned Finkelstein and Chomsky as the views you value the most on this issue. Nonetheless there is some disagreement between them on the issue. For Finkelstein, the Jewish lobby groups DO have a role in framing policy in Washington. The introduction into the political mainstream of critical analysis of Israel and its US lobbyists is, for Finkelstein, reflective of the fact that Israel and its US lobbyists are starting to lose the propaganda war.
For Chomsky this notion that the Jewish lobby frames policy in Washington is the equivalent of saying "the tale wags the dog". He points to the fact that whenever the US's interests clash with Israel (like in protracted arms deal to China) the former can be relied to put its foot down and we hear not a peep from Israel or her supporters.
I am inclined to agree with Chomsky. I also agree with him that elite/intellectual opinion over there is strictly tied up in the power structure. It is for this reason that Mearsheimer (a proclaimed political realist) and Carter's (a former US president) contributions could be significant. Namely for the following reasons.
Control of the region and its resources is of course as important to the US as it has ever been. However the situation in Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan has given rise to a greater unease among the elites about the best course to take in the future. What Washington must fear the most at the moment is that the Shia majorities in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq seek to join forces. It can sabotage this by ensuring these countries remain divided (as it has successfully done in Latin America until very recently). However Palestine is a sore in the region which unites Arab people unlike any other issue (hence Ahmedinijad's attempts to court Arab support with his comments about wiping Zionism off the map, apologies for the translation). The US is presently trying to manipulate the Arab League into taking action against Iran. Out of this the US could (tho I doubt under the present administration) tolerate the idea of a Palestinian state (with the approximate strength and sovereignty of Haiti say) in order to satisfy its longer term plans in the region. Where this would leave its Sparta/"cop on the beat" remains to be seen; but I think the fact that there is this more mainstream analysis of the US's relation with Israel is an indication that they are flirting with this idea.
Let me know what you think
Sam
Sam - apologies for the delay in responding, and if the following is brief.
On the US role, I quite agree, it underwrites Israeli policy. I have mentioned this actually as being pretty crucial (if not above then in other parts of the conversation either at Lenin's blog or on the medialens message board). The two-state settlemetn is supported by Americans. Explaining to those people that what their government has been advocating is not a genuine version of what they advocate, and then mobilising their support, would be absolutely decisive. You're familiar with that argument from Chomksy, no doubt. I agree with it.
On whether the "tail wags the dog", I think if you look at Finkelstein's recent lectures in the UK (the LSE one might still be on Google video), you'll see that his and Chomsky's views are actually pretty identical. The Israel lobby takes care of political discipline in individual cases, but the overall strategic direction is set by the demands of US power.
Your last para reflects my own views to a large extent. The US recognises that the Palestinian issue undermines it, but is only prepared to do the minimum necessary to appear to be addressing it because the strength of Israel is more important. That's not really new. What is new is its increasingly tenuous grip on events in the region, and obviously that opens up possibilities in terms of changes in policy. But the nature of US power remains constant, so the possibilities are limited, at least without the kind of intervention from the electorate that we've been talking about.
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