When is a ceasefire not a ceasefire?

The answer of course is, when only one side has to stop firing.

And there's a supplementary answer: when its a formalised military victory for the other side.

After nearly a month Britain and the US have finally agreed to a draft UN resolution calling for a ceasefire, but one whose terms would secure through diplomacy what the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) has so far failed to achieve through violence. The draft resolution implicitly permits Israel to occupy southern Lebanon, and gives it the right to take military action in self-defence, which as Tel Aviv would no doubt claim, covers all the acts of violence undertaken so far (i.e. - bombing of factories producing glass and milk, farm workers loading vegetables onto refrigerated trucks, a Greek Orthodox church, telecom towers, roads, bridges, clinics and hospitals, fuel depots and Beirut’s port and airport in what renowned Middle East scholar Juan Cole described as “total war on the Lebanese civilian population”).

But whilst Israel is instructed to cease “offensive military operations” by the draft resolution, Hizballah has to cease “all attacks”.

Exasperated onlookers might ask how hard it could have been to call, at the earliest possible point after 12 July, for both sides to cease all military activity and comply with international law. But that would depend on what principal outcome you were looking for; and end to the killing, or a victory for one of the belligerents. Tony Blair’s claim that “I agree the important thing is to get the ceasefire as soon as possible” is meaningless, since the only “ceasefire” he was interested in was one that came as a victory on Israel’s terms. Israel no doubt also wants victory as soon as possible, and if that victory comes it will cease firing, since no one keeps fighting a war after they have won it.

Of course, it should be recalled that the US and the UK weren't remotely interested in any negotiated solution until it became clear that Israel was failing to achieve its objectives against Hizballah by force alone. Only since the ominous resilliance of Hizballah's forces became clear did they step up their diplomatic efforts from simply trying to silence any international censure of Israel to attempting to impose a formal settlement in Tel Aviv's favour, whilst leaving their ally to pursue the military track simultaneously. Winston Churchill said that it is better to jaw-jaw than war war, but Blair and Bush clearly don't believe that this is necessarily true. This afternoon, the proposed draft appears to be failing, but that won't concern Washington and London unduly since stopping the violence - as they have made abundently clear - is not an end in itself. What they want is to attain their strategic objectives. If that can be achieved through diplomacy then fine. But for now the central policy remains as I described in an earlier article: "give war a chance".