Iraq's future: the present course and the alternatives
“There are some who feel like that if they attack us that we may decide to leave prematurely. They don't understand what they're talking about, if that's the case. My answer is, bring them on. We've got the force necessary to deal with the security situation.”
George W. Bush - 2 July 2003
“George W. Bush, you have asked us to 'bring it on.' And so help me, [we will ] like you never expected. Do you have another challenge?”
Iraqi resistance propaganda video - 2004
Just after the fall of Baghdad two years ago President Bush, in an ostentatious propaganda set-piece reminiscent of a Roman triumph, landed a jet on the runway of the USS Abraham Lincoln and disembarked in front of a banner reading "Mission Accomplished". Iraq, we were told, was gazing upwards at the bright new dawn of freedom. Now in 2005, mired in a brutal counter-insurgency war, it finds itself instead staring deep into the abyss. What are the prospects for its future?
Recently, on his indispensable Middle East blog "Informed Comment", Juan Cole, Professor of History at the University of Michigan, took a "step back from the daily train wreck news" to assess the chances of a solution being reached. The picture he painted was a bleak one.
In summary, Cole's view is that "Given the basic facts, of capable, trained and numerous guerrillas, public support for them from Sunnis, access to funding and munitions, increasing civil turmoil, and a relatively small and culturally poorly equipped US military force opposing them, led by a poorly informed and strategically clueless commander-in-chief who has made himself internationally unpopular, there is no near-term solution [to Iraq's problems]."
"The US military cannot defeat the Sunni Arab guerrilla movement any time soon. The guerrillas have widespread popular support in the Sunni Arab areas of Iraq. Guerrilla movements can succeed if more than 40 percent of the local population supports them. [The insurgents] probably have 80 percent support in their region. The guerrillas are mainly Iraqi Sunnis with an intelligence or military background, who know where secret weapons depots are and who know how to use military strategy and tactics to good effect. They are [also] well-funded. The Americans have lost effective control everywhere in the Sunni Arab areas."
"There are too few US troops to fight the guerrillas.....70,000 US fighting troops [and] only 10,000 US troops for all of Anbar province, a center of the guerrilla movement. There are [an estimated] 40,000 active guerrillas and another 80,000 close supporters of them. The US military has been consistently underestimating their numbers and abilities. [Furthermore,] there is no prospect of increasing the number of US troops in Iraq."
The insurgents also have the advantage of local knowledge, speaking the language and generally being sympathetic figures for the regional populations. In contrast, "US troops in Iraq are mostly clueless about what is going on around them, and do not have the knowledge base or skills to conduct effective counter-insurgency". More importantly, the US tactic of suppressing opposition with massive force has served to alienate the population further. For example, "Fallujah was initially quiet, until the US military fired on a local demonstration against the stationing of US troops at a school". After repeated US counter-insurgency assaults the city is now a wasteland. (Its worth mentioning that when British commanders attempted to persuade the US of the principle of minimal force, which they believe they had applied successfully in Northern Ireland, the Americans "just laughed"). And Cole does not take an optimistic view of the new Iraqi military being able to take over the failing counter-insurgency effort anytime soon, not least since it is "heavily infiltrated with sympathizers of the guerrillas".
Furthermore, "The quality of leadership in Washington is extremely bad. George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, and outgoing Department of Defense officials Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, have turned in an astonishingly poor performance in Iraq". Iraq has certainly been a masterclass in how to screw up an occupation. Even Nazis didn’t face problems such as these as a colonial power in Europe. Nor did the US in Japan or the Allies in Germany make such an awful mess of running someone else's country.
Cole's view is that "The guerrilla tactic of fomenting civil war among Iraq's ethnic communities, which met resistance for the first two years, is now bearing fruit". He also mentions other factors contributing to sectarian strife. "The political process in Iraq has been a huge disaster for the country. The Americans emphasized ethnicity in their appointments and set a precedent for ethnic politics that has deepened over time. Deep debaathification [summary sacking of the former administrative and governing class] has led to thousands of Sunnis being fired from their jobs for simply having belonged to the Baath Party, regardless of whether they had ever done anything wrong. They so far have no reason to hope for a fair shake in the new Iraq".
The ideal solution in Cole's opinion would be that "the United States would relinquish Iraq to a United Nations military command, and the world would pony up the troops needed to establish order in the country". However, "George W. Bush is a stubborn man and Iraq is his project, and he is not going to give up on it. And, by now the rest of the world knows what would await its troops in Iraq, and political leaders are not so stupid as to send their troops into a meat grinder".
I don't agree with Cole on this point. Firstly, whether the US gives up control of Iraq depends to a large extent on the US population. They face many obstacles, but theirs is still a largely free and democratic country. The immorality of colonising Iraq is plain, as is the fact of its failure. The task for the US electorate is therefore clear. The British, as America's principal ally, also have a role to play in this respect.
Secondly, we should ask ourselves if it is true that the international community, by replacing US forces in Iraq, would be sending troops into a "meat grinder". The answer depends on one's impression of the resistance; something that is hard to formulate with any level of certainty given the shortage of information. Cole appears to view the insurgency as largely Ba'athist, but augmented by "foreign jihadi fighters, [numbering] probably only a few hundred.. but disproportionately willing to undertake very dangerous attacks, and to volunteer as suicide bombers." However, there is another school of thought, which views the resistance as comprising a broader mixture of disaffected Iraqis, many if not most of whom are unconnected with Al Qaeda or the old regime, which may be lesser elements in a broad and fragmented religious/nationalist uprising.
Last week Asia Times Online reported that “Recent meetings of the so-called Higher Committee for National Forces (a grouping of Iraqi resistance bodies) and the 16th Arab National Congress held in Algiers played a pivotal role in building consensus among various Iraqi communist, Islamic, Ba'athist and nationalist groups on several issues, such as the right of Iraqis to defend themselves against foreign aggression and imperialism, and the right of Iraq to demand a political process untainted by occupation and which reflects the uninhibited will of the Iraqi people for a pluralistic and democratic Iraq. The groups also condemned the continued occupation of Iraq and the establishment of any permanent US bases in the country, the privatization of the Iraqi economy and foreign corporations' unrestricted access to Iraq's resources.”
The mention of “a pluralistic Iraq” is certainly at odds with Cole's view of “[a] guerrilla tactic of fomenting civil war”. Its worth noting that, contrary to popular belief, the vast majority of insurgent attacks are not on civilians but on military targets (contrasting sharply with the activity of US forces, who continue to terrorise the population with indiscriminate attacks, e.g. colossal aerial bombardment of civilian areas). It appears that sectarian insurgent attacks that target civilians are in fact the work of an extremist minority within the broader resistance. If this is true, would it not be possible to isolate and then neutralise such groups if wider, popular grievances were addressed? (And conversely, is it not likely that a failure to resolve the conflict and its causes will strengthen and encourage extremist elements and methods within the insurgency, and indeed within the counter-insurgency as well? The recent wave of car bombings and reported US resort to local death squads may well be evidence of this.)
Cole says at "In the long run, say 15 years, the Iraqi Sunnis will probably do as the Lebanese Maronites did, and finally admit that they just cannot remain in control of the country and will have to compromise". But it there is much evidence to suggest that the resistance is for the most part not owned by former regime loyalists or religious fanatics driven by a desire to (re)gain control of Iraq, but is rooted in popular anger at the occupation amongst ordinary Iraqis, of which there is no shortage.
If this is indeed an accurate picture, then a demonstrably independent UN force could, with an enormous effort to persuade Iraqis of its goodwill, deflate the insurgency simply by replacing the US troops. If the conflict in Iraq is not for the most part a civil war, a nihilistic Al Qaeda killing spree or a power-grab by Ba'athists, but instead a conflict between US troops and an array of resisting forces rooted in the population, then the removal of one side from the battlefield would surely go some significant way to ending the bloodshed. If, as Cole argues, the resistance relies on a deep reservoir of popular support, and that support is fed by animosity to the US forces, does it not follow that the removal of the US would help to drain that reservoir?
A Muslim peacekeeping force under the command of the UN (something which has already been proposed) comprising Sunni and Shia troops and answering to the General Assembly, not the Security Council, could maximise the beneficial effect a US withdrawal would have for internal security. Such a force would be far more acceptable to the population, leaving any remaining belligerent forces isolated and easier to deal with. Its clear that many Iraqis are attacking Americans, not because Muslim Arabs are pathologically violent, but because they are enraged at being occupied by the country that backed Saddam, killed half a million of their children with sanctions and is now in the process of wrecking their homeland. After a US withdrawal, Iraq would still have a serious security problem, but one that would have been downgraded from a full scale guerrilla war to a terrorist threat from an isolated minority. UN troops would therefore not be entering a “meat grinder”.
Iraqis could then spend some of their efforts looking to the future. After fresh elections, this time held under UN observation, a new government could move to create the prosperity within which a stable democratic society can thrive. To do this it would need the profits of oil sales to improve infrastructure and living standards. National debt would therefore have to be cancelled and US imposed privatisation schemes abandoned. In addition, natural justice demands that substantial reparations be paid by the nations that backed Saddam and that devastated the country with sanctions and bombing. Bringing these elements together would mean that Iraq could face the future with a degree of confidence.
Is this scenario realistic? Will powerful elites and nation states allow such a solution to be taken forward? In light of the catastrophe that is the US occupation its not hard to foresee in the short term the withdrawal of what elite support remains for the adventure. A solution similar to that described above may come to be seen as the only realistic one for arresting Iraq's descent into hell, something the global economy can ill afford. But western populations should not sit around hoping that elites will do the right thing, or that whatever suits elite interests might one day happily coincide with what is the right thing to do. To effect these solutions the measures taken to bring down Apartheid, free India, win the vote, end segregation, secure labour rights and score countless other victories should be repeated on an enormous scale, forcing governments to act. The US is already all but defeated in Iraq. With assistance from western populations that defeat could be turned into a victory for the Iraqi people, and for the world as a whole. If that victory is to be won, then it is for civil society across the globe to take the action required in order to achieve it.
George W. Bush - 2 July 2003
“George W. Bush, you have asked us to 'bring it on.' And so help me, [we will ] like you never expected. Do you have another challenge?”
Iraqi resistance propaganda video - 2004
Just after the fall of Baghdad two years ago President Bush, in an ostentatious propaganda set-piece reminiscent of a Roman triumph, landed a jet on the runway of the USS Abraham Lincoln and disembarked in front of a banner reading "Mission Accomplished". Iraq, we were told, was gazing upwards at the bright new dawn of freedom. Now in 2005, mired in a brutal counter-insurgency war, it finds itself instead staring deep into the abyss. What are the prospects for its future?
Recently, on his indispensable Middle East blog "Informed Comment", Juan Cole, Professor of History at the University of Michigan, took a "step back from the daily train wreck news" to assess the chances of a solution being reached. The picture he painted was a bleak one.
In summary, Cole's view is that "Given the basic facts, of capable, trained and numerous guerrillas, public support for them from Sunnis, access to funding and munitions, increasing civil turmoil, and a relatively small and culturally poorly equipped US military force opposing them, led by a poorly informed and strategically clueless commander-in-chief who has made himself internationally unpopular, there is no near-term solution [to Iraq's problems]."
"The US military cannot defeat the Sunni Arab guerrilla movement any time soon. The guerrillas have widespread popular support in the Sunni Arab areas of Iraq. Guerrilla movements can succeed if more than 40 percent of the local population supports them. [The insurgents] probably have 80 percent support in their region. The guerrillas are mainly Iraqi Sunnis with an intelligence or military background, who know where secret weapons depots are and who know how to use military strategy and tactics to good effect. They are [also] well-funded. The Americans have lost effective control everywhere in the Sunni Arab areas."
"There are too few US troops to fight the guerrillas.....70,000 US fighting troops [and] only 10,000 US troops for all of Anbar province, a center of the guerrilla movement. There are [an estimated] 40,000 active guerrillas and another 80,000 close supporters of them. The US military has been consistently underestimating their numbers and abilities. [Furthermore,] there is no prospect of increasing the number of US troops in Iraq."
The insurgents also have the advantage of local knowledge, speaking the language and generally being sympathetic figures for the regional populations. In contrast, "US troops in Iraq are mostly clueless about what is going on around them, and do not have the knowledge base or skills to conduct effective counter-insurgency". More importantly, the US tactic of suppressing opposition with massive force has served to alienate the population further. For example, "Fallujah was initially quiet, until the US military fired on a local demonstration against the stationing of US troops at a school". After repeated US counter-insurgency assaults the city is now a wasteland. (Its worth mentioning that when British commanders attempted to persuade the US of the principle of minimal force, which they believe they had applied successfully in Northern Ireland, the Americans "just laughed"). And Cole does not take an optimistic view of the new Iraqi military being able to take over the failing counter-insurgency effort anytime soon, not least since it is "heavily infiltrated with sympathizers of the guerrillas".
Furthermore, "The quality of leadership in Washington is extremely bad. George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, and outgoing Department of Defense officials Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith, have turned in an astonishingly poor performance in Iraq". Iraq has certainly been a masterclass in how to screw up an occupation. Even Nazis didn’t face problems such as these as a colonial power in Europe. Nor did the US in Japan or the Allies in Germany make such an awful mess of running someone else's country.
Cole's view is that "The guerrilla tactic of fomenting civil war among Iraq's ethnic communities, which met resistance for the first two years, is now bearing fruit". He also mentions other factors contributing to sectarian strife. "The political process in Iraq has been a huge disaster for the country. The Americans emphasized ethnicity in their appointments and set a precedent for ethnic politics that has deepened over time. Deep debaathification [summary sacking of the former administrative and governing class] has led to thousands of Sunnis being fired from their jobs for simply having belonged to the Baath Party, regardless of whether they had ever done anything wrong. They so far have no reason to hope for a fair shake in the new Iraq".
The ideal solution in Cole's opinion would be that "the United States would relinquish Iraq to a United Nations military command, and the world would pony up the troops needed to establish order in the country". However, "George W. Bush is a stubborn man and Iraq is his project, and he is not going to give up on it. And, by now the rest of the world knows what would await its troops in Iraq, and political leaders are not so stupid as to send their troops into a meat grinder".
I don't agree with Cole on this point. Firstly, whether the US gives up control of Iraq depends to a large extent on the US population. They face many obstacles, but theirs is still a largely free and democratic country. The immorality of colonising Iraq is plain, as is the fact of its failure. The task for the US electorate is therefore clear. The British, as America's principal ally, also have a role to play in this respect.
Secondly, we should ask ourselves if it is true that the international community, by replacing US forces in Iraq, would be sending troops into a "meat grinder". The answer depends on one's impression of the resistance; something that is hard to formulate with any level of certainty given the shortage of information. Cole appears to view the insurgency as largely Ba'athist, but augmented by "foreign jihadi fighters, [numbering] probably only a few hundred.. but disproportionately willing to undertake very dangerous attacks, and to volunteer as suicide bombers." However, there is another school of thought, which views the resistance as comprising a broader mixture of disaffected Iraqis, many if not most of whom are unconnected with Al Qaeda or the old regime, which may be lesser elements in a broad and fragmented religious/nationalist uprising.
Last week Asia Times Online reported that “Recent meetings of the so-called Higher Committee for National Forces (a grouping of Iraqi resistance bodies) and the 16th Arab National Congress held in Algiers played a pivotal role in building consensus among various Iraqi communist, Islamic, Ba'athist and nationalist groups on several issues, such as the right of Iraqis to defend themselves against foreign aggression and imperialism, and the right of Iraq to demand a political process untainted by occupation and which reflects the uninhibited will of the Iraqi people for a pluralistic and democratic Iraq. The groups also condemned the continued occupation of Iraq and the establishment of any permanent US bases in the country, the privatization of the Iraqi economy and foreign corporations' unrestricted access to Iraq's resources.”
The mention of “a pluralistic Iraq” is certainly at odds with Cole's view of “[a] guerrilla tactic of fomenting civil war”. Its worth noting that, contrary to popular belief, the vast majority of insurgent attacks are not on civilians but on military targets (contrasting sharply with the activity of US forces, who continue to terrorise the population with indiscriminate attacks, e.g. colossal aerial bombardment of civilian areas). It appears that sectarian insurgent attacks that target civilians are in fact the work of an extremist minority within the broader resistance. If this is true, would it not be possible to isolate and then neutralise such groups if wider, popular grievances were addressed? (And conversely, is it not likely that a failure to resolve the conflict and its causes will strengthen and encourage extremist elements and methods within the insurgency, and indeed within the counter-insurgency as well? The recent wave of car bombings and reported US resort to local death squads may well be evidence of this.)
Cole says at "In the long run, say 15 years, the Iraqi Sunnis will probably do as the Lebanese Maronites did, and finally admit that they just cannot remain in control of the country and will have to compromise". But it there is much evidence to suggest that the resistance is for the most part not owned by former regime loyalists or religious fanatics driven by a desire to (re)gain control of Iraq, but is rooted in popular anger at the occupation amongst ordinary Iraqis, of which there is no shortage.
If this is indeed an accurate picture, then a demonstrably independent UN force could, with an enormous effort to persuade Iraqis of its goodwill, deflate the insurgency simply by replacing the US troops. If the conflict in Iraq is not for the most part a civil war, a nihilistic Al Qaeda killing spree or a power-grab by Ba'athists, but instead a conflict between US troops and an array of resisting forces rooted in the population, then the removal of one side from the battlefield would surely go some significant way to ending the bloodshed. If, as Cole argues, the resistance relies on a deep reservoir of popular support, and that support is fed by animosity to the US forces, does it not follow that the removal of the US would help to drain that reservoir?
A Muslim peacekeeping force under the command of the UN (something which has already been proposed) comprising Sunni and Shia troops and answering to the General Assembly, not the Security Council, could maximise the beneficial effect a US withdrawal would have for internal security. Such a force would be far more acceptable to the population, leaving any remaining belligerent forces isolated and easier to deal with. Its clear that many Iraqis are attacking Americans, not because Muslim Arabs are pathologically violent, but because they are enraged at being occupied by the country that backed Saddam, killed half a million of their children with sanctions and is now in the process of wrecking their homeland. After a US withdrawal, Iraq would still have a serious security problem, but one that would have been downgraded from a full scale guerrilla war to a terrorist threat from an isolated minority. UN troops would therefore not be entering a “meat grinder”.
Iraqis could then spend some of their efforts looking to the future. After fresh elections, this time held under UN observation, a new government could move to create the prosperity within which a stable democratic society can thrive. To do this it would need the profits of oil sales to improve infrastructure and living standards. National debt would therefore have to be cancelled and US imposed privatisation schemes abandoned. In addition, natural justice demands that substantial reparations be paid by the nations that backed Saddam and that devastated the country with sanctions and bombing. Bringing these elements together would mean that Iraq could face the future with a degree of confidence.
Is this scenario realistic? Will powerful elites and nation states allow such a solution to be taken forward? In light of the catastrophe that is the US occupation its not hard to foresee in the short term the withdrawal of what elite support remains for the adventure. A solution similar to that described above may come to be seen as the only realistic one for arresting Iraq's descent into hell, something the global economy can ill afford. But western populations should not sit around hoping that elites will do the right thing, or that whatever suits elite interests might one day happily coincide with what is the right thing to do. To effect these solutions the measures taken to bring down Apartheid, free India, win the vote, end segregation, secure labour rights and score countless other victories should be repeated on an enormous scale, forcing governments to act. The US is already all but defeated in Iraq. With assistance from western populations that defeat could be turned into a victory for the Iraqi people, and for the world as a whole. If that victory is to be won, then it is for civil society across the globe to take the action required in order to achieve it.
posted by David Wearing at 9:24 PM
1 Comments:
Had a discussion on the "UN Option" on Ari Berman's Nation blog a little while ago http://www.thenation.com/blogs/outrage?bid=13&pid=2866 since its pertains to this article I thought I'd reproduce it here.
****
Ari - Good to see the resistance being accurately represented as a broad mixture of disaffected Iraqis. This article http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GA21Ak03.html is still the best description of the insurgency that I've read in the last two years. It names groups and describes agendas, which is something we don't often see. The standard picture of "Saddam loyalists" and extreme Islamist groups is looking less and less plausible.
Its also worth noting that the vast majority of insurgent attacks are not on civilians but on military targets. http://www.lefthook.org/Charts/NYTimes.jpg
This contrasts with the activity of the US forces, who continue to terrorise the population with indiscriminate attacks, e.g. aerial bombardment of civilian areas http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=2047 Whilst sectarian strife and terrorism are certainly at work in Iraq, the major conflict there is not a civil war but a war of occupation between US troops and an array of resisting forces rooted in the population. The mainstream media have done a great job in ensuring that this simple fact is not understood.
www.democratsdiary.co.uk
Posted by DAVEWEARING 05/27/2005 @ 07:43am
How is the U.S. going to disengage itself? The region's oil is vital to the world's economy; if there is a disruption of the flow the price will go through the roof, putting all industrial nations into economic shock. Without stability--or at least "control"--in Iraq, U.S. armed forces will be required.
Posted by MTSPENCE05 05/27/2005 @ 2:28pm
Dave--Very useful post. I'll check out your blog.
Posted by ARI BERMAN 05/27/2005 @ 4:24pm
MTSpence05 - backing Saddam while he committed all his worst atrocities, killing over a million Iraqis through sanctions, devastaing the country through two wars and a decade of bombing and killing hundreds of thousands more in the process means that the US is not the competant authority when it comes to being custodian of Iraq.
Iraq would stabilise to a great extent simply by virtue of the US not being there. Most of the terrorist acts in Iraq are committed by US forces (if the word terrorism has any meaning) and the vast majority of resistance attacks are aimed at them, not at the population or the new government.
More generally, the US policy of aggressive warfare, backing tyrants and generally suppressing the aspirations of the people of the Middle East has done more to destabilise that region than anything other single factor in the post war era. All that's required of US forces is for them to be withdrawn, and not just from Iraq, so that the rest of the world can run its own affairs without the 'stabilising' influence of the neo-con brains trust.
Posted by DAVEWEARING 05/28/2005 @ 06:23am
Davewearing--I'm not advocating the U.S. remain in Iraq; I am only being "realistic". At this time the "insurgency" may be aimed at the U.S. occupation and its lackeys, but what's going to happen if those forces are withdrawn? This is not a Western nation with democratic traditions, a history of pragmatism (our "allies" in the region, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are autocratic regimes); I do not see the various competing factions in the nation working out their differences in a peaceful manner. And as I pointed out, you have Syria on one side, Iran on the other, Turkey, Saudi Arabia--what guarantee is there that things will work out in Iraq, rather than a civil war that results in a Shite fundamentalist theocracy (and a break away Kurdistan that Turkey would be hard pressed to allow) antagonistic to Saudi Arabia?
That oil is there and there is no getting away from that fact; any alternative to the U.S. remaining as an occupying force has to guarantee the reserves in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Even only a minor disruption in production and supply (or just the damn fear of a disruption) will cause major economic problems for Europe, China, Japan, and the U.S.
Posted by MTSPENCE05 05/28/2005 @ 5:50pm
MTSPENCE05 - with respect, I'm not sure you are being realistic.
"At this time the "insurgency" may be aimed at the U.S. occupation and its lackeys, but what's going to happen if those forces are withdrawn? This is not a Western nation with democratic traditions, a history of pragmatism"
I'm sure you don't mean it as such but there are borderline-racist undertones here (and racism isn't realism). The first sentence appears to assume that the violence is simply aimed at the US because they happen to be there, and if they weren't it'd be aimed at someone else. Might we at least consider the possibility that many Iraqis are attacking Americans not because Iraqis are pathologically violent but because they are enraged at being occupied by the country that backed Saddam, killed half a million of their children with sanctions and is now in the process of wrecking their country?
You say that Iraq has no democratic traditions. Is your solution that it be controlled by the country that backed Pinochet, Mobutu, Saddam, and continues to back the vicious House of Saud (a selection from many examples past and present). Is this the western democratic tradition? Even if you disagree its worth at least acknowledging the fact that many in the third world look at this Western "democratic tradition" as hypocrisy – as a bad joke - and do so with very good reason.
On sectarianism in Iraq, and the ill-informed nonsense that passes for western understanding of the situation, try this http://riverbendblog.blogspot.com/2005_05_01_riverbendblog_archive.html#111736857847338021
Its also worth noting that Iraq had a flourishing civilisation long before America existed, and long before Europe managed to produce the same. Beyond the spurious notion of the west's sober and sensible democratic traditions as opposed to the orient's wilful and wanton lack of pragmatism lies the reality of human being's natural propensity to strive towards prosperity and peace, and their ability to do so given the appropriate conditions. This self-determination has been systematically denied to the people of the Middle East by the US because it has its own plans for the region (see the destruction of Iran's democracy and its replacement by a US –backed dictatorship). It is these US policies, not a lack of pragmatism on the part of the victims, that has led to the region being beset by tyranny, extremism and violence, rising oil prices etc etc.
Again, if you want a stable Middle East the best contribution the US could make would be to stop interfering. The response to anyone urging the west to "stay the course" ought now to be "stay what course?". Iraq is plunging into hell because of the US, not in spite of it. The US is the problem, not the solution. Iraq would still have serious problems after withdrawal. But the principle, most serious problem of all would have been dealt with
www.democratsdiary.co.uk
Posted by DAVEWEARING 05/31/2005 @ 11:42am
Daveweaing: First and foremost, I'm not pro-occupation, nor do I believe the the Western (or more exactly, the US) conception of "democracy" is some sort of panacea for (or is even non-toxic to) the Middle East. And, yes, I'm aware that Iraq is the "Cradle of civilization" and that the mess that is the Middle East is the direct result of Western interfernce in the region. And I am confident you are aware of the stages, the process of developing a "democracy" in the post Industrial Revolution world, along with the difficulties of a stable, viable government growing (and I mean stable, viable in the sense that it will play the world game as it is now practised)in a heterogeneous land with deep cleavages, a wrecked economy and infrastructure, etc., and nations with an acute interests in the outcome of exactly what kind of government emerges next door to them.
It's a bit of a conundrum. Jr. and his swine advisors have "broken" Iraq in the sense that there is not now a strong central government capable of controlling its population and ensuring that its oil (as well as that in neighboring Saudi Arabia) is available for the global economy. If the US pulls out, maybe everything will work out for the best and we will all live happily ever after. Maybe. Now you or I may be willing to roll the dice, hope for the best, but those that enjoy priviledge, wealth, power in our society (in China, Japan, Western Europe, as well as in the US) depend upon the stability of the world market. Do you really think they are going to gamble with so much at stake? Just one little spike in the price of oil can put our economy into shock; a massive, prolonged interruption of supply could have catastrophic results--revolutionary results--on the system as we know it (and as they profit off of it).
My comments on the Iraqi (Arab) propensities for developing a just, equitable society are not racist or any other such thing. As the contemporary US illustrates, a large, thriving middle class is a prerequisite for a truly "democratic" society (and by that I mean to point out that it is, at best, a disfunctional democracy, if a democratic form at all). Without that middle class, the economic development that creates the strata, along with a heritage ("right and wrong" are not universals, they are extremely subjective terms) and so many other things that I am not qualified to lecture on, it's more than just difficult to develop a stable, fair system.
There are forces, groups jockeying for power in Iraq. Do any of these groups have a tradition of peaceful compromise; what is the history of these interests, especially in respect to interacting with each other?
The ability of humans to strive towards prosperity and peace? In order for a relative few to be rich, a great many must be poor--that's just the way it works. And ever since humans stopped following the seasons, the herds and became sedentary (as they first did between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers thousands of years ago) there have been some that--for whatever reasons--felt they deserve more than the rest. That's humankind. I don't like it, agree with it, condone it...that's just the way it has been, is, and most likely always will be. And I say this only because you do have to be realistic when attempting to solve a problem such as the US occupation of Iraq. This "We just have to get out" thing is nothing more than wishful thinking. There are far too many powerful outside interests involved and with a vital stake in the outcome to believe developments in Iraq can simply be left to chance.
Posted by MTSPENCE05 05/31/2005 @ 3:30pm
MTSPENCE05 - again, I realise that one has to be realistic in attempting to solve a problem like this. Again, I don't see that what you're saying is particularly realistic at all. In regard to your last paragraph, and your version of realism ("In order for a relative few to be rich, a great many must be poor--that's just the way it works"), I'd refer you to this by Howard Zinn: http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Foreign_Policy/Machiavelli_ForPol.html
"If the US pulls out, maybe everything will work out for the best and we will all live happily ever after. Maybe."
Let's put it another way: If the US stays in Iraq, everything will certainly not work out for the best. This is now beyond doubt. No roll of the dice is required. No maybes. Iraq will remain at war, oil prices will continue to rise, the region will continue to be destabilised by the presence of the hated US Army, Iraq as a nation will continue to fall apart. The disaster you predict if the US leaves Iraq are already transpiring precisely because the US policies are in the process of creating that very disaster as we speak. The sickness cannot simultaneously be the cure.
"There are forces, groups jockeying for power in Iraq. Do any of these groups have a tradition of peaceful compromise; what is the history of these interests, especially in respect to interacting with each other?"
Again, there are two principle forces "jockeying for power in Iraq": The US and its opponents. The US certainly does not have a tradition of peaceful compromise with its opponents internationally. It is rather like any other world power throughout history in that respect. Its history of "interacting with" any independent forces in Iraq is that it crushes them and installs client regimes which in turn breed resentment among the population leading to violence and the very thing that you're concerned about: instability. The removal of the US from the equation must therefore be a step towards a better Iraq, which as you rightly point out is essential for the whole world as well as being an end in itself.
In contrast to the American influence, there are numerous peaceful and democratically inclined groups in Iraq who long for an end to violence and a restoration of basic living standards. The greatest of these is the population itself. It should be noted that countries such as India and South Africa have emerged from western tyranny to become states that can at least manage extreme poverty and desperate internal strife without falling apart altogether, and may just have great futures ahead of them. You are right to point out that a post-US Iraq will continue to face many problems (albeit one major problem less than before). How can we give it the best chance of success?
To maximise the beneficial effect a US withdrawal would have for internal security a Muslim peacekeeping force under the command of the UN (which has already been proposed http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43378-2004Oct18.html) comprising Sunni and Shia and answering to the General Assembly, not the Security Council, should be created. Such a force would be far more acceptable to the population, leaving any remaining belligerent forces isolated and easier to deal with.
After fresh elections held under UN observance and in keeping with principles of the UN Charter, the new government's next task would be to create the prosperity within which a stable democratic society can thrive. To do this it will need the profits of oil sales to improve infrastructure and living standards (Incidentally, Venezuela is currently using its oil wealth in a similar way, in the face of dedicated US opposition). National debt and US driven privatisation schemes should therefore be cancelled. In addition, massive reparations should be paid by the nations that backed Saddam and that devastated the country with sanctions and bombing. These factors would give Iraq a far better chance of being a fully paid up member of the international community than it will ever have with the dead hand of the US on its shoulder.
"those that enjoy privilege, wealth, power in our society (in China, Japan, Western Europe, as well as in the US) depend upon the stability of the world market. Do you really think they are going to gamble with so much at stake?"
With Iraq such an obvious failure under the US occupation I wouldn't be in the least bit surprised if elite support was withdrawn, just as it was in the case of Vietnam. Where Iraq is concerned, it was never that strong to begin with. Elites may well see a solution similar what I've described as the only realistic one for arresting Iraq's descent into hell; something none of us can afford to allow. But I do not suggest that we sit around hoping that elites do the right thing, or that whatever suits their interests might one day happily coincide with what is the right thing to do. I suggest that people do what they did to bring down Apartheid, free India, win the vote, end segregation, secure labour rights and score countless other victories: force our governments to act. The US is already defeated in Iraq. With assistance from western populations that defeat could be turned into a victory for the Iraq people, and the world as a whole. But for that to happen it is for us to decide, as we are perfectly capable of doing, what is "realistic" and what is not.
www.democratsdiary.co.uk
Posted by DAVEWEARING 06/01/2005 @ 10:56am
You're preachin' to the choir, dave. And you make some excellent points, have some great ideas (the Arab force is the only logical solution). I'm not nearly so optimistic, however. I live in a country that has re-elected the boob that created this mess--along with so many other messes--and all the Democrats could manage was John Kerry. Hell, huge amounts of the electorate in this country still believe Saddam had something to do with 9/11, really had WMD's, etc. And it is not people like me that will decide to pull the US forces out. I fear it will get much worse before it gets better.
But aside from the obvious ineptitude of the US and its "Coalition of the Willing," what about the regional players? Will Syria, Iran et al. stay on the sidelines and watch passively? With so much at stake (all that oil) can a geniune effort (under UN auspices) to establish a legitimate government in Iraq be anything more than wishful thinking?
Posted by MTSPENCE05 06/01/2005 @ 12:31am
I'd just refer you to my last paragraph. People like you (and me) do make these decisions. Indians gained independence and South Africans beat Apartheid in the face of considerably greater opposition than we're faced with here.
Will Syria and Iran stand aside? I think we can safely say that if Iraq were a UN protectorate then any aggressive military action, or any other overt attempts at interference from neighbouring states, would be pretty much unthinkable. The peacekeeping force would need sufficient backing, but as I've said, that's down to us.
www.democratsdiary.co.uk
Posted by DAVEWEARING 06/01/2005 @ 1:10pm
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